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Abstract
Contracts are mechanisms for carrying out transactions. Leasing land is a voluntary transaction in
which property rights - such as user and income rights - are transferred from landowners to tenants.
The bundle of property rights transferred within a lease transaction varies with the type of contractual
arrangement. Analysis shows that for the landowner the value of the bundle of property rights to land
is determined by the type oflease contract. Landowners prefer lease contracts with as little regulation as
possible. Lease regulation can be characterized as a 'handbook' for concluding lease contracts. However,
reducing regulation requires a shift in co-ordination mechanisms from that of the handbook to that of
the 'invisible hand' (prices) and 'handshake' (e.g., mutual adjustment). Making use of the handshake and
price as co-ordination mechanisms implies that the importance of trust and reputation will increase for
both tenant and landowner. In 20°7, the Dutch government introduced two new types of formal lease
that rely less on handbook co-ordination. Whether a more liberalized lease system will lead to a change
in the area leased not only depends on landowners but also on tenants, because contracts are two-sided
mechanisms.
Additional keywords: contractual relationships, co-ordination mechanisms, landowner, lease policy, lease
regulation, liberalization, tenant
Introduction
Today, land-leasing policy in the Netherlands is still under discussion. An important
starting point for the beginning of this discussion was the 2000 report of the Lease
Policy Commission (Commissie Pachtbeleid; Anon., 2000), entitled Ruimte voor Pacht
(Scope for Leasing). This report evaluated the current policy and suggested policy
amendments. The Commission concluded that maintaining the current levels of
protection of the tenant would lead to the marginalization ofleasing. The Commission
therefore proposed to drastically liberalize the lease policy. After a discussion lasting
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some seven years, the Lease Regulation of September zo07 adopted a more liberalized
lease, although the changes were not drastic.
During the lease policy debates, the legal aspects ofchanging the rules dominated the
discussion. Little attention was given to institutional economic aspects, such as the type
of contracts between landowner and tenant, and the economic impact of these contractual
relationships. Leasing ofland requires landowners to agree to a contract with tenants.
Such contracts have a number ofcharacteristics, such as a voluntary exchange, co-ordination
and motivation mechanisms, implicit or explicit agreements, and a degree of flexibility.
Lease contracts transfer parts of the bundle of property rights - such as the user and
income rights - from the landowner to the tenant in exchange for a benefit, primarily
a lease rent. As well as being a transaction mechanism, a lease contract is a two-sided
exchange between landowner and tenant, often for a specific period.
An important difference between land lease and land ownership is the incomplete
power ofcontrol over the bundle ofproperty rights. The lease contract defines the transfer
of property rights: what is transferred to the tenant and what is left for the landowner.
So an intriguing question is: what is the relationship between the properties oflease
contracts and the values of the different contractual arrangements for the landowner?
The purpose of this paper is twofold: (I) to analyse the properties oflease contracts
including the bundle of property rights; and (z) to determine - theoretically and
empirically - the value of the bundle of property rights of different types oflease
contracts from the viewpoint of the landowner.
This paper proceeds as follows. The following chapter gives an overview of
the area ofleased land and briefly describes the types oflease contract used in the
Netherlands. Next, the properties of the lease contracts are analysed, with emphasis
on the co-ordination mechanisms used in lease contracts and property rights. In the
chapter thereafter, the values of the bundle of property rights for different contractual
arrangements are determined based on a survey among landowners and land agents.
The final chapter concludes.
Land lease contracts in the Netherlands
The total area ofleased land in the Netherlands has sharply declined in the course
of time. It reached its maximum in 1948 with 57% of the total area of agricultural
land being leased. This peak was largely the result of the granting of land in the
Wieringermeerpolder and the Noordoostpolder - two polders reclaimed from the
former Zuider Zee - to tenant-farmers. Between 1950 and zooS' the area of rented
land gradually decreased to about z7% of the total agricultural area. Tables I and z
provide an overview of the developments that took place during the period 195°-zooS.
In the period I995-zo05, the percentage of regularly leased land was still decreasing
(Table z). Even with two new types oflease - the one cultivation-cycle lease and the
single-term lease - both introduced through the Lease Law of 1995, the total area of
leasing decreased after 1999. The hereditary lease - which is not included in Table
z - decreased from about 4% in 1995 to z% of the total agricultural area in zooS
(Anon., zo07) and does not fall under the Lease Regulation. There are several types
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Table 1. Distribution (%) ofland use (1950-2005).
195° 1959 197° 1979 1983 1985 199° 1995 2°°5
Ownership 44.1 47.6 51.9 59·9 61.4 63.0 67·5 7°·3 73·3
Lease I 55·9 52.4 48.1 4°·1 38.6 37.0 32.5 29·7 26.2
I Excluding hereditary lease and grey lease.
Sources: Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI) & Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
Table 2. Distribution (%) ofland leased under different types of contract.
Year Total area Regular lease One cultivation- Singe-term
leased I cycle lease lease
1997 29.0 22·7 1.6 4·4
1998 29·3 21.7 1.8 5·4
1999 29·9 21.5 1.8 6.1
2°°3 26·7 21.0 1.6 3·9
2°°5 26.2 20·5 1.8 3.8
I Excluding hereditary lease and grey lease.
Sources: Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI) & Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
of hereditary lease and the yearly rent is often higher than the rent of a regular lease
contract. The duration of a hereditary lease is at least 26 years.
Prior to the adaptation of the legal Lease Rules in 2007, the last important
modification of the tenure system in the Netherlands was made in 1995. As shown in
Table 2, since the modification of the Lease Law in 1995 there are three main formal
types ofleasing farmland in the Netherlands:
1. Regular lease contracts. These contracts have a term of 12 years for farmsteads and 6
years for plots ofland. Important characteristics of these contracts are: price control
by lease rent-standards, continuation rights for the tenant, and priority rights for the
tenants for the sale and purchase of land. In the period 1997-20°5 the area of regular
lease contracts declined from 23% to about 21% of the total agricultural area (Table 2).
In 2005, the area under regular lease was about 394,000 ha.
2. One cultivation-cycle lease. These contracts for a plot ofland have a term of one or
two years, with no price control, no continuation rights, and no priority rights for the
tenants. In the period 1997-2°°5 the area of one cultivation-cycle lease contracts was,
on average, about 2% of the total agricultural area (Table 2). In 2005, the area under
one cultivation-cycle lease was about 35,000 ha.
3. Single-term lease. These contracts for plots ofland have a minimum duration of one
and a maximum of 12 years, with no price control, no continuation rights, and no
priority rights for the tenants. It is a once-only contract; parties are only allowed to
conclude such a contract for a certain plot ofland once. In the period 1997-2°°5, the
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area under single-lease contracts was on average about 4.5% of the total agricultural
area (Table z). In zooS' the single-term lease was about 73,000 ha.
These three types oflease contract were regulated through the 1995 Lease Law,
which implies that regular lease contracts and single-term lease contracts have to be
approved by the Land Tenure Board (Grondkamer). The Land Tenure Board checks
whether the contracts are in accordance with the Dutch lease regulation. For one
cultivation-cycle leases, only registration by the Land Tenure Board is required.
The zo07 Lease Regulation introduced two new types ofliberalized formal lease
contracts that replaced the single-term lease: (I) a contract of 6 years or shorter, and (z)
a contract longer than 6 years. Both types imply no continuation and priority right for
the tenant, but compulsory approval by the Land Tenure Board. The lease for more than
6 years also includes price control to lease rent-standards by the Land Tenure Board.
Regular leases and one cultivation-cycle leases were hardly affected by the adaptation of
legal Lease Rules in zo07.
In addition to formal lease contracts, there are also grey-lease contracts, which
are not registered or approved by the Land Tenure Board. They can be used as an
alternative to formal lease contracts. The total area under grey-lease contract has
increased from about 150,000 ha (~ 8% of the total agricultural area in the Netherlands)
in 1997/98 to about 190,000 ha, or almost 10% of the total agricultural area in zooS
(Berkhout & Van Bruchem, zo07). Very few data are available on this type of contract.
Grey-lease contracts are concluded with a specific objective (e.g., sale-contracts of
manure, cultivation-cycle contracts, sub-leasing). The content and form of this type of
lease contribute significantly to flexible land use. Research on grey-lease contracting
also indicates a certain continuity in the relationship between tenant and landowner
(Slangen et a!., zo03), indicating that the identity of the parties is important.
Properties of lease contracts
Lease contracts are governance structures for carrying out lease transactions. Examples
of such structures are markets, firms, contracts, and clubs (see also FitzRoy et a!., 1998).
Lease contracts can be described on the basis of the following properties: (I) voluntary
exchange; (z) containing (a) co-ordination and (b) motivation mechanisms; (3) they can be
explicit or implicit; (4) they are incomplete; and (5) property rights are transferred from
landowners to tenants. These properties will be described in the following.
Voluntary exchange
Concluding a lease contract is a voluntary exchange, implying that it is only accepted if
the expected result of the agreement is individually and mutually advantageous to both
parties (Milgrom & Roberts, I99z).
Co-ordination mechanisms
Each lease contract contains co-ordination mechanisms. The relationship between
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contracts and co-ordination mechanisms deserves further attention. First, there is
no one-to-one relation between the two, because certain contracts - including lease
contracts - can make use of a mix of different co-ordination mechanisms (cf. Hennart,
1993). Secondly, co-ordination is a central issue in a governance structure. The contract
has to specify what needs to be co-ordinated and how the co-ordination is achieved in
governance structures such as spot markets, firms and contracts.
Figure I gives an overview of four groups of co-ordination mechanisms. Co-
ordination can take place by one of the four groups or by a combination of them. On
the left side we have the 'invisible hand' group. The co-ordination mechanism here is
the price. The price is the co-ordination mechanism for the governance structure 'spot
market'. In land lease contracts, purchase and delivery (or quid and quo) do not take
place at the same moment. This means that the price, like in pure spot markets, cannot
be the sole co-ordination mechanism for lease contracts.
At the bottom of Figure I we have the so-called 'handbook' group. The 'handbook'
- as a co-ordination mechanism - is often used for the governance structure 'contracts'.
For detailed contracts the emphasis is on the handbook. Contracts often also contain
a price as a co-ordination mechanism. In that case the co-ordination mechanism of
contracts consists of a combination of 'handbook' and 'invisible hand'. In general, the
type of contract determines which co-ordination mechanism will prevail and what role
the price will play in the relationship between the two parties.
For regular land lease contracts, the co-ordination mechanism consists of rules,
directives and safeguards based on the Lease Regulation. This means that the co-
ordination mechanism for regular lease contracts emphasizes the 'handbook', given by
lease regulation. Important characteristics of these contracts include: a fixed duration
(12 years for farmstead and 6 years for plots ofland), price control by lease-price
Handshake
Mutual adjustment
Common values and
norms
Identity matters
Invisible hand
~
Visible hand
Price ...... Co-ordination .... Authority
t Direct supervision
Handbook
Rules
Directives
Safeguards
Figure 1. Co-ordination mechanisms (adapted after Borgen & Hegrenes, 2005)
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standards, continuation and priority right for the tenants. Because of price control
by regional lease-price standards - tested by the Land Tenure Board - the price plays
a minor role as a co-ordination mechanism. The modest role of the price as a co-
ordination mechanism also holds for the liberalized lease contracts lasting more than
six years, because of the price control to lease-rent standards by the Land Tenure Board.
However, as continuation and priority rights for the tenants are lacking, there is less
emphasis on the handbook compared with regular leases.
The single-term lease and the one cultivation-cycle lease have no price control
and no continuation or priority rights for the tenant. Both make use of a mix of the
handbook (but less intensively than the regular lease contracts) and the price as a
co-ordination mechanism, because there is no price control. Based on an analysis of
contracts registered by the Land Tenure Board it was concluded that the lease price is
higher for single-term lease contracts than for regular lease contracts (Slangen et a!.,
zo03). No data were available for one cultivation-cycle lease. For the liberalized lease of
six years or shorter, we may expect the same mix of co-ordination mechanisms as for
the single-term lease.
At the right side of Figure I, we have the 'visible hand' group based on hierarchy,
which means that the positions in a firm are ranked: higher order levels command
lower levels. In this case the co-ordination will be carried out by authority or direct
supervision. The 'visible hand' group of co-ordination mechanisms is not relevant for
contracts in general, and lease contracts in particular. After all, landowners have their
own business and are not vertically integrated with the tenant-farmer. Both parties
- the landowner and tenant-farmer - retain their separate external identity.
An exception to this could be sharecropping. Sharecropping is prevalent in low-
income countries such as developing countries. However, sharecropping is also a
common lease form in some developed countries such as the USA and New Zealand. In
the USA about z5% of all agricultural enterprises use some form of sharecropping (see
also Allen & Lueck, zooz). This form ofland tenancy is known for its many versions:
from sharing the yields to sharing costs of inputs and combinations of it. In Western
Europe, the fixed monetary leases are dominant and sharecropping is almost unknown.
In fact, in the Netherlands, sharecropping is legally prohibited and practically
eliminated. The Lease Regulation prescribes a fixed monetary lease price. So for formal
lease contracts in the Netherlands, a lease price that depends on sharecropping results
is not possible (see also Slangen et a!., zo03). An extensive analysis of sharecropping in
the USA is given in this volume in the paper of Huffman & Fukunaga (zo08).
At the top of Figure I we have the 'handshake' as a co-ordination mechanism.
Important elements of the 'handshake' are common values and norms, mutual
adjustment, and the identity of the persons involved. Common values and norms
(based on repeated interaction promoting solidarity, consensus and trust) and codes of
conduct can serve as a co-ordination mechanism concerning groups of people. Mutual
adjustment refers to the co-ordination achieved by informal horizontal communication.
In practice, as explained before, grey-lease contracts also involve continuity in the
relationship between tenant and landowner. It means that the identity of contracting
parties matters. The 'handshake', supplemented with the price, is often used as a
co-ordination mechanism for such types oflease contracts. So the co-ordination
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mechanism for grey lease is a mix of the 'handshake' and the 'invisible hand'. Grey-
lease contracts can be verbal or written, the content is free and officially unknown,
which is an important difference with the regular, the single-term and the one
cultivation-cycle lease. The fewer prerequisites by regulation for liberalized lease with
a duration of 6 years or shorter (see previous chapter) and no price control implies
a mix of 'handshake', price and - to a lesser extent - 'handbook' as co-ordination
mechanisms. For the liberalized lease longer than 6 years, the price control by the Land
Tenure Board is still compulsory. This means more emphasis on the 'handbook' for
this type of contract than for a liberalized lease with a duration of 6 years or less.
Motivation mechanisms
Another property of contracts is that they contain motivation mechanisms (Milgrom &
Roberts, 1992). The motivation mechanisms for regular, single-term, one cultivation-
cycle and grey lease are not the same. Motivation can be driven by external factors, such
as lease regulation and financial incentives, and by internal ones, like the pressure
or feelings to do one's work well, trustworthiness and having or building-up a good
reputation. However, there can be a trade-off between internal and external motivation,
such that too much emphasis on external motivation can drive out internal motivation
(Le Grand, 2003).
Explicit and implicit contracts
An important property oflease contracts is that the set of agreements in a contract can
be explicit or implicit. An explicit contract is a written document about the agreement.
This especially applies to the regular lease. The lease contracts for the single-term lease,
the liberalized lease with a duration of 6 years or less, and the one cultivation-cycle
lease are less explicit. They have no price control, no continuation and no priority rights
for the tenants, but the contracts for the single-term lease and the liberalized lease
with a duration of 6 years or less have to be approved by the Land Tenure Board. One
cultivation-cycle lease contracts have only to be registered. The liberalized lease of more
than 6 years holds a position between regular lease contracts and other formal ones.
Grey-lease contracts often have the character of an implicit contract: no formal
record of the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties. Such contracts are
enforceable by the reputation mechanism (see also Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). For this
type of contract it is important that parties are able to develop and maintain a desired
reputation. A party with a short-term horizon is less willing to invest in a reputation
than a party with a longer-term horizon. Similarly, investing in a reputation is more
attractive at the beginning of an activity (such as leasing) than at the end. As indicated
before, the identity of contracting partners matters and therefore contract parties have
to build up reputation.
Incompleteness
Lease contracts are incomplete. In brief, this means that events could take place that
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were not foreseen in the contract. For example, the introduction of production rights
for milk, sugar, manure or ammonia, and the introduction of income rights (single
farm payment) were not taken into account by lease contracts that date from long
before these rights were introduced. In the current lease system, the Agricultural
Land Tribunal safeguards formal lease contracts. Legal principles also limit potential
consequences of incomplete contracts such as opportunistic behaviour of tenant and
landowner, and hold-up problems (Slangen & Oskam, zo03). Such problems arise from
investments in buildings (barns and sheds), drainage and soil improvement that were
not taken into account in the lease contract (Slangen et a!., zo03). Hold-up implies that
important specific investments in land and buildings are not carried out. If a tenant
has a contract without the possibility for renewal or continuation of the contract, or
without compensation for the investments, he will not invest. The lease regulation for
regular lease contracts contains safeguards for such investments. However, single-term
lease contracts and one cultivation-cycle lease contracts offer less protection for specific
investments.
Transfer of property rights
The last property is that lease contracts can be characterized as a bundle of property
rights that is partly transferred from landowner to tenant. The bundle of property rights
consists of: the rights (I) to use the land, (z) to acquire income from the land, (3) to
change the form and substance of the land, (4) to exclude others, and (5) to transfer
the land to others through markets or to their heirs (see also Furuboth & Richter,
zooS). Especially the income and transfer rights are often emphasized as marking the
economic meaning of ownership. As explained earlier, in the Netherlands we have
different types of land tenure contracts, comprising different bundles of property
rights. The bundle of rights that is transferred within a lease transaction varies with
the contractual arrangement. The contract specifies the allocation of the property
rights to land between the landowner and the tenant. The bundle of property rights
can be described in terms of (I) control, (z) division, (3) protection, (4) duration, (5)
enforceability, (6) flexibility, and (7) transferability.
Controlrightsoverpropertyrights
In general, control rights are rights to make decisions concerning use, returns or
transfer of an asset. In terms of property rights to land, control rights indicate up to
what level a person has the right to make decisions about the bundle of property rights
to land and about land-related property rights. Control rights consist of (I) specific
control rights and (z) residual control rights. The specific control rights are the rights
specified by the lease contract or lease regulation. Residual control rights are the
rights to make decisions on the assets' use, returns, and transfer that are not explicitly
controlled by law or assigned by a contract (see also Hendrikse, zo03).
The residual income from land that remains after all obligations are met (residual
income) is often captured by those who have the residual control rights. There are
different types of residual incomes from land and land-related production or income
rights:
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• the residual income in the short term arising from current land use;
• the long-term residual income which arises through the increase in the value of the land;
• the value (plus increase) of the production rights and the income rights (such as the
single farm payment (SFP).
The introduction of production rights for milk, sugar, manure and ammonia has
led to new property rights. The production quotas connected with these rights are
transferable and represent a value. Concerning the milk quota, the tenant is obliged
to return the milk quota in full to the landowner at the end of the lease contract. In
this case the tenant has a right to a fifty-fifty compensation. For sugar, manure and
ammonia, the rules are similar. In the Netherlands, the discussion about the ownership
of the SFP lasted more than a year and a half On 25 September 2007, the Agricultural
Land Tribunal decided that the rights on these SFPs - after terminating the lease
agreement - belong to the landowner. The latter has to compensate the tenant on a
fifty-fifty basis. This rule is in compliance with the milk regulation in the Netherlands.
The person entitled to residual income varies. The short-term residual income goes
to the tenant-farmer who generates marketable products, the long-term residual income
arising from the increased value of the land goes to the landowner, and at least 50% of
the long-term residual income of production rights for milk and income rights of SFP
also goes to the landowner. These three types of residual income are strong incentives
for tenants to become the landowner, certainly if they can buy the land at the leased
value (Slangen et a!., 2003). As to formal contracts, the Agricultural Land Tribunal is
used for solving disputes concerning capturing residual incomes.
Division of property rights
Within the bundle of property rights associated with land, certain property rights can
be distinguished, e.g., user rights. The property rights that a tenant-farmer obtains
consist mainly of the short-term income right and the user rights. However, his right
to transfer (e.g., sub-leasing) and the right to exclude others, are much more restricted
than those of an owner.
Certain rights can also be distinguished based on the degree of excludability, i.e.
the extent to which others can be excluded from use. Lack of excludability leads to
incompleteness of property rights. Two or more individuals together could own the
property rights to an asset. The incomplete divisibility of the property rights means
that some attributes cannot be specified in excludable rights for individual property-
right holders. This means that farmers have to share, for example, the property rights
to nature and landscape with citizens. They can hardly exclude people from enjoying
nature and landscape even on their own land.
Protection of the rights
Property rights created by the government can function as a policy instrument for
achieving certain goals, such as lease contracts (based on the Lease Regulation),
production rights for milk, sugar and manure, and income rights (e.g., SFP). Important
questions are: who gets these rights and who will get effective protection from the
government? The allocation of the property rights also indicates who must pay whom
in order to have access to the interests that are derived from these rights. Important
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aspects are: to what extent are the rights respected, can they be enforced, and are
individuals compensated for a loss of a right? All these questions determine the content
of the bundle of property rights.
The institutional environment, consisting of the informal and formal rules in a
society, is important for the protection of the property rights. This environment in
which the property rights are embedded is not constant, and neither is the status or
the allocation of property rights among people. Property rights may change from one
generation to the other. This is shown by the way in which the government recognizes
and protects property rights. Weak or insecure property rights, such as a lack of
continuation right or no compensation for installed improvements, bring tenant-
farmers in a hold-up situation.
Duration
Is the disposal of a bundle of property rights (or part of it) to land restricted to a
specific period, and if so what is its duration? The periods for which property rights to
farmsteads and plots ofland are leased vary greatly. In the Netherlands, the following
terms apply to land-use contracts: for hereditary lease the term is 26 years or longer, for
a lease of a farmstead the term is 12 years, for a plot ofland the term can be longer than
6 years, 6 years or less, for cultivation-lease I or 2 years. In general, duration has an
inverse effect on the value of the bundle of property rights to the land.
Enforceabilityof propertyrights
The value of the bundle of property rights of lease agreements also depends on
the compliance with the contractual arrangements and enforcement of the rights.
Monitoring, sanctions and conflict-solving are the responsibility of governmental
services. The control on compliance with the current lease system (Lease Regulation and
lease rent-standards) is carried out by the Land Tenure Board. The Agricultural Land
Tribunal functions as a conflict-solving and enforcement mechanism. Enforcement by
governmental services also protects the property rights of the landowner and tenant.
Some people consider the legally enforceable principles currently in use too rigid
(Anon., 2007), referring to the priority and continuity rights for the tenant and the lease-
price testing ofcertain lease contracts by the Land Tenure Board. However, these legal
principles also limit the opportunistic behaviour of tenant and landowner. A weak point of
the legal principles as enforcement mechanisms is that they are not suitable for unverifiable
information (Bovenberg & Teulings, 1999) since they contain no information-revealing
mechanism such as the market mechanism and the reputation mechanism.
Flexibility
Regulation principles reduce the flexibility oflease contract design by landowner and
tenant. Flexibility refers to the questions: (I) are there changes in the rules of the game
of the lease contract design (regulation); and if so (2) what are the consequences?
The single-term and one cultivation-cycle lease increased the flexibility ofland-use
contracting, e.g., more types oflease contracts are now possible. The introduction
of two types ofliberalized leases (in September 2007) meant more flexibility. As
explained, grey-lease contracts are often concluded with a specific objective, mostly
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involving flexibility in land use. Although this type oflease contributes significantly to
flexible land use, it does not belong to lease regulation.
Degree of transferability
The bundle of property rights ofland is transferable - partly or fully - from one party
to another party, e.g., by lease, sale and purchase, inheritance. However, the lease
regulation limits transferability of property rights. Examples in the case of regular lease
contracts are priority rights and continuation rights for tenants. Priority rights mean
that if a landowner wants to sell his land he is obliged to offer it to the tenant first.
Continuation rights imply that the tenant has the right to renew his contract. This has
consequences for the value of the bundle of property rights to land.
Based on the foregoing we can conclude that one of the most important characteristics
of regular lease contracts is the 'handbook' as the main co-ordination mechanism and
that the price plays a limited role. The 'handbook' is mainly determined by the Dutch
lease regulation. For regular contracts, lease regulation implies an explicit written
contract, a less flexible contract, and the transfer to the tenant of a relatively large
part of the property rights for a relatively long period. For single-term contracts, the
contract is more flexible (e.g., duration can be chosen from between I and 12 years) and
land rents are free. Given the area and the growth of grey lease, it can be concluded
that lease contracts that are based on the 'handshake' as a co-ordination mechanism
and supported by the reputation mechanism are better able to fulfil the demands of
landowners and tenants. Single-term leases can be positioned between the regular
lease and the grey lease, and could be expected to be an alternative for the regular lease.
However, the area with formal single-term lease contracts (introduced in 1995) did
not grow since 1999. Apparently, single-term lease contracts hardly meet the needs of
landowners and tenants.
The valuation of the different contractual arrangements:
empirical results
In the previous chapter we concluded that regular and single-term contracts do
not meet the needs oflandowners and tenants. The preferences oflandowners for
different contract types can be assessed by valuing their actual contracts. We expect
that landowners attach a lower value to land under regular lease contracts than to land
under other types oflease contract. To assess the differences in landowners' valuation
between different lease contracts, we carried out a large mail survey among landowners
and land agents in autumn 2002 (see also Slangen et a!., 2003). This survey was one
of the first surveys among landowners and land agents that focused on property rights
to land in the Netherlands. The targeted landowners belonged to the Dutch Society
of Landowners (Federatie Particulier Grondbezit) ofwhom 250 randomly selected
members received a questionnaire. One hundred and five completed questionnaires
were returned - a response of nearly 42%.
Land agents fulfil a different role compared with landowners. They are experts
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who often work for the landowners, but also as intermediaries between tenants and
landowners. One hundred and forty five questionnaires were sent to a randomly
selected sample ofland agents. Sixty completed questionnaires were returned - a
response of nearly 41% (see also Slangen et a!., 2003). The structure and content of
both questionnaires were similar, the differences were related to the different roles of
both groups. The land agents were used as reference group.
Results and discussion of the survey
When considering the behaviour oflandowners, it is important to look at the question
ofwhy they have land. From their answers (Table 3) it appears - in terms of percentage
of respondents - that maintainingfamily property was the most important reason,
followed, in terms of percentage of hectares, by land ownership as an investment. The
category other reasons was largest. This is caused by the area of the State Forestry Service
and nature conservation organizations, which keep land for wildlife and landscape
management, and often are large landowners.
Leasing land is one of the other objectives ofland ownership. Within these
objectives there is a certain hierarchy. When the objective with the highest hierarchy
is achieved, it will be possible to realize the other objectives. The objective with the
highest hierarchy is the return on capital/investment or profitability target. If this is
Table 3. Reasons oflandowners for owning land (n ~ I05).
Reason Respondents Area
------------------ (%) --------------------
Maintaining family property
Investment
Managing and conserving real estate
Other
IO
r6
35
43
Note: as it was possible for interviewees to indicate more than one reason, the percentages do not add up to lOO.
Table 4. The value of untenanted and tenanted land in the opinion ofland agents and landowners.
Value of tenanted land
relative to untenanted
land
Value of tenanted land
depends on type of
lease contract
408
Land agents
Landowners
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92
73
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sufficient it is possible to realize the other objectives. A good return makes it possible
to realize the other targets of the landowners as well. More than one third of the
respondents gave investment as reason for land ownership (Table 3).
Landowners and land agents were asked to value the land under the different land
lease contracts. Both groups stated that the value of tenanted land is about 50% of the
value of untenanted land (Table 4). The small difference in response between land agents
and landowners was not statistically significant. A significant majority ofboth groups
furthermore stated that the value of tenanted land depends on the type oflease contract.
Given the fact that different land-leased contracts have a different bundle of
property rights, we may expect - based on the previous chapter - that land with lease
contracts without any restrictions concerning lease price, continuation rights or priority
rights will have a higher value from the viewpoint of the landowner. Duration can also
playa role. A one cultivation-cycle lease has a duration of lor 2 years, and the single-
term lease a duration ranging from I to 12 years. Because of this, we may expect that
the one cultivation-cycle lease has a higher value for the landowner than the single-term
lease. Given the rules for regular lease, we may expect the landowners to assign the
lowest value to regular lease contracts.
Individual landowners and land agents were asked to rank land with different lease
contracts from I to 5, where I indicates the highest and 5 the lowest value. This resulted
in five sets of rankings for five different lease contracts. The objective was to determine
associations among the rankings by using Kendall's coefficient of concordance W
(Siegel, 1956; Churchill, 1999). Kendall's coefficient of concordance expresses the
degree of association among variables. For instance, in this case iflandowners would
have agreed unanimously to the value of the bundle of property rights of a particular
lease contract, that contract would always have received the ranking I for the highest value
and thus the sum of ranks would have been 34 (the number oflandowners - Table 5) and
Table 5. Ranking of types ofland lease contract according to their value in the opinion oflandowners and
land agents.
Lease type
Regular lease
Single-term lease
One cultivation-cycle lease
Grey lease
Hereditary lease
Statistics
Number of observations
Kendall's W
x"
d.f.
P-value
Mean rank by:
Landowners
3·5
34
0.26
34·7
4
0.00
Land agents
4·5
2.6
2.1
2.0
0.00
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the mean rank would have been 1. The second-ranked contract would then have a sum
of ranks of 68 (mean rank 2), and the bundle with the lowest value would have received
a rank of 170 (mean rank 5). If there is little agreement among the rankings of the five
contracts, the sum of ranks would have been more or less equal per contract type.
A statistically significant value of W indicates that landowners or land agents are
applying essentially the same standard in ranking the five types ofcontract (Siegel, 1956).
The coefficient ofconcordance is more or less x"-distributed where x" ~ k(n-I) W (k is the
number oflandowners; n -lis the number ofdegrees of freedom). The null hypothesis
is that the rankings are not related, and the alternate hypothesis is that there is some
agreement. From the P-value it follows that the null hypothesis can be rejected (P < 0.01).
Table 5 gives the mean rankings ofleased land according to their value assigned by
landowners and land agents. The one cultivation-cycle lease has the highest value for
the landowners, followed by grey lease. For the landowners, single-term lease is the
third highest, followed by hereditary lease. The differences between landowners and
land agents are small; land agents value grey lease higher than one cultivation-cycle
lease. As Table 5 shows, regular lease has the lowest ranking. It is even lower than
hereditary lease. However, as has been mentioned before, hereditary lease does not fall
under land lease regulation. The value of Kendall's W is lower for the landowners than
for the land agents. However as Table 3 shows, the motivation for land ownership is
rather diverse, which has consequences for the valuation of contracts. For example, if
we only look at landowners who own their land for 'investment', Kendall's Wwill be
substantially higher (about 0.6).
Conclusions
Measured in hectares, the three most important types ofland lease contract are regular
lease, grey lease and single-term lease. In September 2007, the single-term lease was
replaced by two types ofliberalized lease: contracts for more than 6 years and contracts
for 6 years or less. When land is leased to a tenant-farmer, the landowner transfers
part of the bundle of property rights of his land, mostly on a contractual basis. This
means that he will lose part of the bundle of property rights for a certain period. The
lease contract is the transaction mechanism and the content of the contract defines the
transfer of property rights. In other words, the bundle of rights transferred within a
lease transaction varies with the type of contract. The type oflease contract determines
the value of the bundle of property rights for the land that remains for the landowner.
One of the most important characteristics of regular lease contracts is the 'handbook'
as the main co-ordination mechanism (based on the Lease Regulation) and the limited
role of prices as a factor of adjustment. The single-term leases also make use of the
handbook approach, but less intensively than regular lease contracts, because they have
no price control and no continuation or priority rights for the tenants. The absence of
price control for single-term lease contracts and its successor - single-term lease contracts
shorter than 6 years - increases the role of price as a co-ordination mechanism. For the
liberalized lease longer than 6 years, price control still applies.
Grey-lease contracts do not follow the formal lease regulation. The co-ordination
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mechanism for grey lease is a mix of the 'handshake' and the price. The motivation
to comply with the agreements comes from elements such as financial incentives and
trustworthiness. For enforcement and renewing of grey-lease contracts, reputation is
very important. Given the current lease regulation, building a good reputation is less
important for regular lease transactions.
Lease regulation reduces the flexibility oflease contracts. Especially in regular lease
contracts, flexibility is almost non-existent. Single-term lease contracts offer more
flexibility. However, this type oflease is less important than grey lease. Apparently,
parties prefer grey lease to single-term lease. It is expected that the two versions of
liberalized lease will contribute to more flexibility. The lease contracts differ in the
content of the bundle of property rights transferred. For the landowner, the value of the
contract will be higher if:
• the level of control rights determined by lease regulation and contract is lower;
• the degree of transferability of the bundle of property rights is higher;
• the division of the rights is more to the benefit of the landowner;
• the protection of the rights for the tenants is lower;
• the duration of the contract is shorter;
• the flexibility of contract design is higher;
• more use is made of the price as co-ordination mechanism.
The empirical results confirm that the value ofleased land for landowners depends
on the type of contract. From the viewpoint of the landowner, the value of the bundle
of property rights of single-lease, one cultivation-cycle lease and grey-lease contracts is
significantly higher than for regular lease. Grey-lease contracts are valued highest. An
intriguing question is why in spite of the high ranking of one cultivation-cycle lease,
the area of this type oflease remains so small. One of the reasons could be that one
cultivation-cycle lease is used for special crops, such as bulbs, carrot, and seed potato.
These results will have important policy consequences. First, iflandowners
have more opportunities to lease plots ofland with long-term formal lease contracts
(liberalized lease), without price control, and no continuation or priority rights
for tenants, this is expected to lead to a further decline of the area of regular lease
(including farmsteads) in the future. Secondly, it is questionable whether the liberalized
lease will be able to stop the decline in the formal leasing area. During the past 10
years, grey-lease contracts were concluded more often than single-term lease and one
cultivation-cycle lease.
Apparently, landowners prefer grey-lease contracts to single-term lease contracts.
Less regulation requires a shift in co-ordination and motivation mechanisms.
Making use of handshake and price as co-ordination mechanisms, but also of trust
and reputation building, will become more important for tenants and landowners.
Given that the liberalized lease was only introduced in September 2007, we have to
be reserved in our conclusions about future developments. However, our findings
with respect to the single-term lease and one cultivation-cycle lease, together with the
increase in the grey-lease area, indicate that liberalized lease is not expected to maintain
or increase the total area of formal leased land.
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